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 Abstract 
After the Doi Moi (‘renovation’) reforms in Vietnam from 1986, land 
ownership rules were adjusted, effectively terminating former land 
collectivisation efforts. While land ownership remained fully under the control 
of the state, a 1993 land law conferred 20-year leaseholds to most farmers. 
They could now utilize farm land individually, and sell, swap and mortgage the 
land in a situation similar to private ownership. These leaseholds are now 
expiring and a new 2013 land law is in the making. This paper was initially 
written for UNDP Vietnam which supports Vietnam to help formulate a 
strong new land law, and brings out the complexities of land governance in the 
suburban areas of fast expanding Vietnamese cities. It first considers the 
present and changing land use of suburban areas and the key stakeholders 
involved here – powerful State Owned Enterprises, farmers, bureaucrats and 
communist party leaders. Planning practices are then assessed – and seen to be 
both rigid and complex, with different departments at various levels working at 
cross purposes under conditions of conflicting rules, laws and weak capacities. 
This is one reason for the dominance of informal arrangements and 
widespread corruption, where powerful actors benefit hugely and illegally from 
conditions of opacity and informal networks. Overall outcomes are that cities 
expand in a haphazard (‘leapfrog’) and inefficient manner, with insufficient 
attention for timely and adequate infrastructure, the environment and for 
people’s welfare as in social amenities and parks. As a result of lopsided 
incentive systems, it is the state which foregoes huge incomes and faces more 
costly investments, while many suburban farmers are affected through 
(arbitrary) land acquisition and inadequate compensation. 
Keywords 
Land governance, suburban land, planning, environment, urban housing, 
Vietnam 
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Land governance of suburban areas of Vietnam 
Dynamics and contestations of planning, housing and the 
environment 
1 Introduction 
Since 1975, and following the establishment of a Communist state in Vietnam, 
the state, or rather ‘the people’, became the sole owner of all land, and in large 
parts of the country collective farms were established. After the Doi Moi 
(‘renovation’) reforms in 1986, which paved the way for opening up Vietnam’s 
economy and for market-based reforms, land ownership rules were adjusted, 
which was no doubt related to a dramatic decline in agricultural production on 
collective farms. Even while the authority the Communist Party and the state 
remained unchallenged, private enterprise, deregulation and foreign investment 
were now encouraged. Land ownership remained fully under the control of the 
state, but a law enacted in 1993 (and amended in 2003) conferred 20-year 
leaseholds to farmer households most of whom obtained Land Use Rights 
Certificates. They could now utilize farm land individually, and sell, swap and 
mortgage the land in a situation which looks like private ownership – but the 
state retains privileged powers over land and private land-use rights.  
These 20 year leaseholds are to expire in 2013, so that there is an urgency 
in Vietnam to adopt a new land law this year. In anticipation of such new 
legislation, a relatively lively debate started on the matter for some years now 
(heating up considerably from late 2012), partly fuelled by incidents where 
agitated farmers were protesting fiercely or even with arms against forced 
evictions, perceived corruption, or against what they saw as insufficient 
compensation for land claimed by ‘the state’. Various think tanks and academic 
institutions engaged in assessing the dynamics of land ownerships, land 
transactions and the role of the state at the various levels of Vietnamese 
administration – the ministries in Hanoi, the provinces, districts and 
communes – and related impacts on farmers and farmer households.  
The UNDP Office in Vietnam supported the process of moving towards 
the new land legislation, and commissioned a series of studies in the format of 
policy briefs which production was coordinated and supported by the Hanoi 
based Centre for Agricultural Policy CAP of the Institute of Policy and 
Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development (IPSARD), under a contract 
agreement with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)1. I was 
requested to study and provide recommendations as to the topic ‘Evaluating the 
Efficient Use of Suburban Land and Proposing a Model for Urban Agriculture’, for 
which I carried out fieldwork in Vietnam in 2011 with generous support by 
                                                 
1 This text is based on primary data collection in several Vietnam provinces, Hanoi 
and HCMA including interviews, surveys and focus group discussions, as well as on 
collecting and using a variety of secondary sources including policy and legal 
documents, newspapers, websites and general and academic material. The support of 
CAP staff – Dr. Nguyen Do Anh Tuan, Mr. Kim Van Chinh, Ms. Ha Luong Ngoc 
and Ms. Thu Trang was very important and is gratefully acknowledged. 
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CAP and IPSARD2. UNDP has kindly consented that the findings of the study 
can be published as an ISS Working Paper, so as to make the research findings 
available for a wider audience. This UNDP support is gratefully acknowledged. 
Background 
Vietnam is urbanising relatively rapidly, by approximately 1 million annually 
since 1996.  ‘The country is now over a quarter urbanised compared to around 
20% in the mid-1970s. Between 1994 and 1999 net migration contributed to 
around one third of population growth of urban areas. The urban population 
of Vietnam is likely to almost double to around 36 million’ (World Bank, 2006, 
Sharpe and Quang, 2004; Berg et al. 2003). Vietnam News (8-7-2006) reports 
that the total number of people living in Viet Nam’s urban areas is projected to 
reach 30 million by 2010 and that it is estimated that there will be 46 million 
urban dwellers by 2020. The urbanisation rate is expected to increase to 33 per 
cent by 2010 and 45 per cent by 2020. In 2000, 19 million of the country’s 80 
million people lived in urban areas, with an urbanisation rate of 22 per cent. In 
that year, urban land accounted for 63,300 ha, or about 0.2 per cent of the 
country’s total area. The figure is expected to rise to 243,000 ha or 0.74 per 
cent by 2010 and to 460,000 ha, or 1.4 per cent, by 2020.  
The relatively fast urban growth is related to a general fast economic 
development of Vietnam, undergoing a transformation from a state led to a 
market driven economic model, and where the state actively promotes 
industrialisation and modernization. Large investments projects, including 
industrial and special economic zones have developed throughout the country, 
supported by the growth in foreign investment (FDI). And while the country is 
becoming richer, there is increased demand for (good quality) housing, as well 
as for infrastructure and facilities (roads, airports) to make possible both 
industrial and housing developments. And while cities all over the world may 
promote the densification of existing inner city areas, it is in the urban fringe 
where cities mostly expand to accommodate urban growth. Vietnam is no 
exception to this.  
 The major driver for suburban development is the availability of land, 
in combination with low(er) land costs. The suburban areas so become a 
natural location for new housing projects and industrial zones, a model of 
                                                 
2 This publication is then the outcome of cooperation between Dr. de Wit of ISS and 
the Centre for Agricultural Policy CAP of the Institute of Policy and Strategy for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (IPSARD), under a contract agreement between 
ISS and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It does not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for Agricultural Policy.  
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industrial development with which Vietnam is rather pre-occupied3. The 
question arises as to how land in the suburban areas around Vietnamese cities 
is being used and how this land use evolves over time. Do the urban 
authorities have sufficient control over such land use in terms of planning, 
zoning and regulating development and what are the impacts and implications 
for the citizens living there? And since growing cities need more food to feed 
ever larger populations, is there (still) scope for agriculture in and around these 
cities, in various modalities captured under the concept of urban agriculture? 
The policy problem 
There has been a remarkably quick change in urban development in Vietnam 
since the Doi Moi (renovation reforms) were initiated in 1986, and 
developments have been most marked in what is called ‘the urban fringe’, the 
city suburbs, or peri-urban areas. All these concepts refer to the ‘the areas of 
expansion and land conversion at the edge of urban settlements, and areas 
within the urban settlement that are not suitable for urban uses. As such much 
of the urban fringe is characterised by competition between rural and urban 
land uses, with urban land uses typically on the ascendance’ (World 
Bank/Halcrow, 2006:5). Dynamics at the urban fringe, from an economic 
perspective, relate to differential rents for rural and urban uses, where urban 
land use may push out rural/agricultural land uses. However, even while there 
is a relation between distance from a city and land use change, this is rarely 
uniform and some areas change faster than others – as a result of geographical, 
market and governmental variations and interactions (ibid:6).    
There is a clear change of land use going on in Vietnam’s suburban areas, 
as a result of the actions (and non-actions) of various stakeholders which are 
listed in the next section. Key players are the Government and State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) which have been engaged in locating manufacturing and 
industry at or beyond the urban fringe of a wide range of cities, so providing 
wage-based employment within reach of formerly agricultural villages (cf. 
Policy Brief on Farmer Welfare: de Wit, 2011). Residents of such villages 
themselves have become agents of change by seizing on ample new 
opportunities for work and income. Migrants to cities as well as people seeking 
other or better housing have also settled or bought in these areas. Socially and 
economically, there is simultaneously integration of urban and rural areas in the 
more populous regions that transcend the administrative designations and 
boundaries.  For example, Sharpe and Quang (2004: 3-12, 16) indicate that the 
pressures of development in the urban fringe of Hanoi are immense, and that 
                                                 
3 Vietnam News quotes the Minister of MONRE: 8-1-2008: ‘In the past nearly 20 
years, about 3 per cent of agricultural land was lost to industry. It is predicted that by 
2020-25, another 10-15 per cent of agricultural land and other types of land will be 
lost to the industry and service sectors. If we want to develop industry, we have to 
allocate land for it. But what type of land should be used for industrial development is 
still an open question. In my opinion, land for industrial development should be the 
hilly land or low- productivity land. It is important to keep highly productive land so 
that we can ensure food security. This is the top priority’. 
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one can speak of an incremental urbanization of villages. They believe 
suburban development tends to disperse new economic activity – often 
haphazardly across large areas leading to urban sprawl. Even the 
announcement of a change in plans may have large impacts: rural land values in 
the peri-urban Cu Chi district of HCMC dramatically increased in anticipation 
of being re-zoned as urban land. The areas of urban zoned land closest to the 
centre of the city have increased by more than 100% between January 2000 
and January 2004 (ibid: 3-5).  
Generally then one can speak of what can be called “Stealth” urbanization: 
‘Settlement areas of rural communes are rapidly becoming more densely settled 
through population growth and housing construction … taking on many of the 
characteristics of urban areas’. This phenomenon does not appear to be 
recognized in the Government of Vietnam’s urban strategy.  It is taking place 
without government support or mitigation of impacts (DiGregorio and Vogler, 
2003).  
This paper then aims to contribute to a better understanding of dynamics 
of change at the urban-fringe of Vietnamese cities, considering issues of (non) 
planning, patterns and changes of land use, and the presence of and future 
prospects for urban agriculture. It will deal with the following issues in specific:  
• Changes and development of suburban land through the time, and the 
functions of suburban land;   
• An assessment of the efficiency, effectiveness, inclusiveness of 
management and policies for suburban land in Vietnam, in terms of 
land use planning and zoning, and environmental issues of suburban 
land use;  
• Related to this, the nature of contestations around suburban land and 
the differential powers and opportunities of different stakeholders such 
as farmers, officials, middle class house owners and investors; 
• Perceptions and opportunities as regards alternative use of suburban 
land by local communities;  
• Alternative options and policy orientation/recommendations to 
improve the efficiency, equitability, inclusiveness and sustainability of 
suburban land use and land governance; 
• Assess the feasibility of urban agriculture and its development in 
suburban areas leading to the formulation of proposals to develop 
models for urban agriculture in Vietnam;  
• Provide suggestions for an analytical framework to understand and 
analyse the above issues. 
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Analytical framework 
Governance and the multi stakeholder policy process 
This paper applies a set of governance perspectives to help understand 
dynamics at the urban fringe, notably a ‘multi-stakeholder governance’ perspective 
located in political economy, starting from a focus on both strong(er) and 
weak(er) stakeholders who operate together in governance and policy arenas 
(the work of Hyden and Court, 200.). Government is not alone any longer in 
governing; there are many other stakeholders in formal and informal 
configurations who co-govern, and who have smaller or larger influence on 
government and government outcomes. Hence, power dimensions are critical, 
e.g. the relative vulnerability of farmers vis-à-vis government officials – where 
the latter interpret the laws and may have a top-down attitude as regards the 
farmers which affects land recovery and land compensation. At a more 
concrete level of analysis, applied are political/ power oriented perspectives on 
the interactive policy process.  This includes top-down versus bottom-up 
perspectives on the policy process, which, for Vietnam incorporates both the 
ideals and the realities of grass-roots democracy, and the widely advocated 
proposals to engage farmers, land owners, citizens in land use planning and 
monitoring. Generally, specific perspectives and ideas/ideology of public 
administration which apply to Vietnam will have to be given due attention. 
Attention is needed for institutional dimensions, including not only the rules 
of the game (North), but also the structure and culture of organisations, the 
role of norms, values and culture in society, for example gender norms, and the 
role of ideology. This also entails looking at the nature and force of the 
incentives which influence the (non)actions of stakeholders.  Another 
dimension of institutions is capacity: the ability of organisations to achieve 
their objectives, but also the capacity of its leadership and staff to contribute to 
these- as in human resources.  
Perspectives on land, legal pluralism  
Perspectives on land are applied, for example considering (suburban) land as 
production factor for (urban) agriculture and perspectives on land as 
commodity, with different practices in a range of development and transition 
countries and changing perspectives on property rights and their enforcement 
in the urban contexts of Vietnam. More concretely, perspectives of suburban 
land use including operational and verifiable indicators for efficiency, 
effectiveness, equitability, inclusiveness and sustainability are used.  
Land governance concepts and analytical issues have been taken on board, 
including issues of managing land use at the local level through a variety of 
stakeholders both local, provincial, national and private sector. An important 
dimension here concerns the incidence of corruption ‘the private use of public 
funds’ even while this definition does not cover all corruption in land related 
transactions, where money can be made by misusing information of upcoming 
land price changes. Hence, the perspectives relating to ‘Good Governance’ 
which include curbing corruption, enhancing accountability and transparency, 
and strengthening capacity are extremely relevant (cf. World Bank et al. 2011).  
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An interesting discourse on legal pluralism at the juxtaposition of law, land 
and culture is represented by authors like Gillespie (2004, 2011) and Sikor 
(2004). They critically question the effectiveness of formalising property rights 
and are concerned about the lack of attention for cultural and historical 
variations which differ from place to place, and in different epistemic 
communities – such as party officials, officials dealing with land matters, courts 
and judges and what Gillespie calls ‘self-regulating communities’ which are 
often successful on solving land disputes by appealing to traditions and cultural 
norms of a village or clan. Such perspectives may be useful not only to assess 
actual outcomes of land disputes, but also explain perhaps the overwhelming 
tendency of the Vietnamese to seek informal solutions to housing and land 
practices.  
The text of this working paper is based on a variety of primary (interviews, 
survey, focus group discussions, observation) and a range of secondary 
sources, and an effort was made to bring together as much relevant literature 
as possible as reflected in the references list. However, it was noted by others 
that the study of urban planning and suburban land use and land developments 
is hampered by a relative lack of studies already done (No Author, 2006).’Very 
few land use planning studies have been performed in rural areas and even 
fewer in urban areas. Not many land use planning studies in rural and very less 
study in urban areas could be found’. 
This text has been set up to deal with the following topics in seven 
sections: 1. Land use changes; 2. Stakeholders; 3) planning and zoning; 4) 
corruption and informality; 5) Benefits and impacts of alternative uses of 
suburban land for local communities; 6) Urban agriculture; and 7) Conclusions.  
2   Land use changes 
This table is an indication of land use change in the case of HCMC (from Tran 
Thi Van, 2006) 
TABLE 1 
Land use / Year 1995 (%) 2000 (%) 2005 (%) 
Built-up land 14.90 18.41 24.21 
Agricultural land 47.94 46.42 42.79 
Forest 16.55 15.98 16.16 
Water 16.31 16.23 15.76 
Unused land 4.30 2.96 1.08 
 
A table on Hanoi depicts developments in the city and surrounding areas 
(Sharpe and Quang, 2004: 3-17):  
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TABLE 2 
 Spatial Distribution of Residential Projects in 1986-19994 
Distance  Housing Project Land Allocated 
Number Percentage Area (m2) Percentage 
0--2 km 39 4.66 150,962 4.03 
2--5 km 506 60.46 1,844,646 49.30 
5--8 km 220 26.28 1,126,288 30.10 
>8 km 72 8.60 620,060 16.57 
Total 837 100.00 3,741,956 100.00 
 
Several sources, as well as our own fieldwork data indicate that agricultural 
land is being changed at a high rate into use for residential and other purposes 
(see also Policy Brief by  De Wit, 2011 on Farmer Welfare). One source states 
that, in the whole of Vietnam, 10,000 hectares of agricultural land is 
transformed for  non-agricultural use in peri-urban areas each year. Hanoi lost 
an average of 268 ha of rural land annually between 1988 and 2000, (Sharpe 
and Quang, 2004: 3-2). In many areas wet rice agriculture has been superseded 
by more intense vegetable market gardens and domestic or local industries, 
trade, services or remittances5 (DiGregorio and Vogler, 2003). A case study of 
one suburban commune near Hanoi indicates land use changes as follows: 
agricultural land reduced from 43,7 to 16.7 %; paddy land from 23.8 to 11.2%, 
and build up areas increased from 32.6 to 72.1% (Sharpe & Quang, 2004:3-25). 
And even if some farmland remains in between new industrial or housing 
developments, this is often no longer suitable for farming: plots are too small; 
the former irrigation works have been undermined or are no longer effective, 
or there is pollution. 
Tran Thi Van (2006) argues that, due to uncontrolled rapid urban 
expansion, there is considerable loss of agricultural land around HCMC. This 
has led to ecological unbalance and a disappearance of traditional agricultural 
trade villages. Low-lying land areas cultivating wet rice (in district 2) were 
replaced for balancing the drainage, but construction and what he calls 
‘concretization’ processes have again changed these into  actual urban areas 
causing water flows into lower old urban areas and regular flooding. He argues 
that, when agricultural land is changed into land for non-agricultural purposes, 
only a few groups of rich people have good living level, whereas in contract 
nearly all farmers who used to live on their land for generations, become poor 
and face a difficult life. However, evidence from other sources and our own 
fieldwork indicate that this does not always have to be the case – and that 
                                                 
4 According to statistics covering 837 housing projects undertaken during the 1986-
1999 period, 60.5% of these representing half of the total developed land was located 
in the zone 2-5 km from the city centre where many old villages are situated.  The 
fringe zone 5-8 km from the centre attracted about 26.3 percent of the projects and 
30.1 percent of the total land area.  
5 Such developments contrast with a professed national interest to safeguard food 
security e.g. in terms of making sure there remains enough land for growing rice. 
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some farmers are also benefiting from urbanisation – and the employment and 
income opportunities it brings along. 
Industry and industrial parks 
The urban fringe is the preferred location for new industries, either in the form 
of separate factories, or in the form of industrial parks. Observations in the 
urban fringe of HCMV indicates that the landscape is scattered with smaller 
and larger factories, most of which in operation, others not in use. The suburbs 
are most known however for industrial parks or industrial zones, where local 
authorities have reserved large areas of land for industry, often relocating 
previous land owners/farmers. By 2005, land had been recovered from more 
than 100,000 households for the development of 190 industrial zones (ADB, 
2005 in Phuc, 2009:4). More than 400,000 hectares of agricultural land were 
converted for other uses from 1995-2000 (ibid.). For example, in Greater 
Hanoi there are more than 50 industrial parks, which constitute 71% of all 
parks in North Vietnam and 23% of all parks in the country. It is beyond the 
scope of this text to go into detail here but it is generally felt that there are too 
many parks in the country, a result of inter-provincial competition, as well as 
unhelpful incentives as regards officials (see later). Many parks are not fully 
used. The ones around Hanoi and HCMC are amongst the most successful 
ones, with more than half occupancy. On the other hand, there are many 
industrial parks which are almost empty (cf. De Wit, 2011, and 
(http://www.grips.ac.jp/module/ vietnam/indparks.html).  
Housing 
The suburbs are also the location for different types of housing developments, 
and this can be illustrated by the case of the Ha Dinh commune, located at 6 
kms south of Hanoi, where the following house construction/ land conversion 
modalities occurred (Quang and Sharpe, 2004:3-24):  
• Development of housing projects by state organizations,  
• Direct construction by government for rent or sale, 
• Informal housing and expansion of squatter settlements 
• Conversion or profiteering by farmers, and 
• Infill of built up areas inside the old village.  
For a general view of developments, taking place in the period following Doi 
Moi:   
Small manufacturing enterprises were attracted by the original nature of Thuong 
Dinh industrial zone.  Small residential development accompanied the relaxation 
of restrictions and economic growth.  Ha Dinh ward experienced accelerated 
urbanization with unorganized conversion of agricultural land to urban uses.  
Private self-built housing and manufacturing operations filled the vacant 
cultivated land and water bodies.  Infill and expansion preceded any planning or 
construction of the necessary infrastructure (water supply, sanitation, roads, 
drainage and electricity).  There were no realistic plans in place and no 
management willingness to control and guide the village’s land use and housing 
development or to provide infrastructure. 
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In a study of a suburban Hanoi ward, Tran Mai Ahn (2005: 10) indicates 
that more than 50% of housing construction was carried out without building 
permission, as people did not consider it necessary, complicated and time 
consuming (60%) or were refused by authority when applying for permission 
(40%). ‘People go on constructing their house because they are ready to pay 
penalty, which is so small compared to construction cost’. The study indicates 
that people come from the inner city of Hanoi to buy land and build houses6 
(20% in the survey carried out), while speculators buy large plots at low rates 
for re-selling (50% of these plots are idle for years). 42% of all residents said 
that they had sold part of their land (ibid:12). The Ward office cannot keep 
track of the land use changes which includes land subdivision (where plots may 
be too small) but also land conversion, including residential land, garden land 
and filling up ponds. Infrastructure is problematic in that the inner area roads 
developed spontaneously, and are in a bad condition. Similar developments are 
reported for a suburban commune near Hue by Nguyen Phuc (2009:10). The 
CECODES/UNDP PAPI (2011) study found that only 7% of the interviewed 
had applied for construction permits when building or renovating their houses. 
It may be noted that investment in land and housing in the urban fringe 
remains a popular aim of using money, as both banks and the stock exchange 
are not trusted (completely). Some are worried about a housing bubble as so 
much housing stock is created, and not all created housing is actually being 
used, but it seen an investment: anticipated gains in capital makes it less urgent 
that the house is actually occupied. As will be elaborated later, most housing in 
Vietnam is owner build, mostly informally without formal approval. According 
to Sharpe and Quang (2004: 3-2) ‘informal development is preferred by most 
people as cheaper, more expedient and not subject to taxation’. They believe 
that the combined efforts of such builders have gone beyond the capacity of 
existing systems for drainage, flood management and solid waste.  
Infrastructure, parks and green spaces 
While Vietnamese cities expand, the need for urban infrastructure raises 
accordingly in terms of roads, water supply systems, sewerage and drainage, 
electricity supply and transportation modalities. It appears that, by and large, 
there are shortfalls as regards timely supply of such infrastructure. Vietnam 
News (3-12-2010) reports that: 
                                                 
6 Vietnam News, 3-4-11: “City dwellers move to suburbs to escape crowds in HCMC: 
‘HCM CITY — Experts said there was a new trend in the country's continuing 
urbanisation process – a move away from city centres to the suburbs to enjoy the 
fresher surroundings there. Speakers at a recent seminar in HCM City on urban 
development said with rapid urbanisation, cities like Ha Noi, Da Nang and HCM City 
are facing serious housing and employment shortages, pollution, creaking 
infrastructure, and social insecurity. To escape, many urban residents, mainly middle-
class people, are moving to greener areas in the suburbs which are yet to be defiled by 
urbanisation. 
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The Construction Ministry report showed that although the infrastructure for 
urban transport had improved, the area of land set aside for this purpose was less 
than 10 per cent of the urban building area, much lower than the international 
standard of 16-25 per cent. … Transport Minister Ho Nghia Dung said the 
investment in transport infrastructure had been inadequate and predicted that it 
would continue to decrease next year. Meanwhile, the number of cars in 2010 
increased by 12.1 per cent over 2009 and the number of motorbikes rose by 10.3 
per cent. 
As will be elaborated in detail when discussing urban planning, there are 
severe problems as regards urban infrastructure in the urban fringe, which 
partly relate to the chosen (or actual) model of suburban growth where 
housing and industry often come first, infrastructure to follow (and at a higher 
cost than when provided initially). But evidence is mixed; against the large new 
road from Haiphong to Do Son, are plenty new housing estates that lack 
electricity and access roads. The Vietnam News newspaper 7 reports that ‘the 
lack of transportation and social infrastructure in Hanoi’s new urban areas has 
been detrimental to the quality of life for the residents, raising concerns about 
the quality of planning and development in the city’. A deputy minister is 
quoted to say that many investors only focus on selling houses, instead on 
investing in wider facilities. A survey of 18 urban area projects showed that 
only 4 areas were well populated thanks due their relatively sufficient 
infrastructure. Shape and Quang (2004: 31) note that ‘Virtually all small scale 
land conversion and self-built housing has occurred without any official 
infrastructure.  Electricity and water are acquired from adjacent existing 
establishments……Drainage is compromised by conversion and loss of canals 
and ditches.  Sanitation is equally compromised by the increased need and the 
decrease in natural systems and potential for aeration’.  
So by and large, suburban land may be used for infrastructure, but this 
then often is of a basic nature, created spontaneously or late, meeting the basic 
requirements of citizens.  
Cities in Vietnam are not known for large parks or green spaces and one 
might expect that spaces for that are being realised in the suburban areas. In 
general, the present area of tree-covered urban land remained small – 5.3 
square metres per head in Ha Noi, and 3.5 square metres in HCM City8. 
However, this research has not found evidence that there is planning in the 
suburban areas for more greenery. This is confirmed in a study by Uy et al. 
2008, which analyses the 2020 master plan for Hanoi. They believe that the 
green spaces as earmarked would be ‘somewhat fragmented and isolated, 
which would lead to a reduction not only of green space, but also the quality of 
ecosystem services. They also find that plan lacks a framework for organizing 
                                                 
7 Vietnam News July 1, 2011 ‘Hanoi in need of urban planning’ 
8. The same Vietnam News reports that Deputy Prime Minister Hai said urban 
development in Viet Nam had failed to meet requirements for environment 
protection, water drainage, solid waste treatment and housing. Deputy Minister Nam 
said more efforts were needed to improve infrastructure in rural areas to induce 
people to remain there, reducing the burden on cities.  VNS/31/12/2010. 
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green structures at different scales. This is an example where there is an 
evident and important need both for the population and for the urban 
environment, but which need is not articulated by any strong interest. This 
study perceived dynamics at the urban fringe from a power oriented 
stakeholder perspective, with weaker and stronger stakeholders all trying to 
articulate their individual or group interest, using various strategies in often 
very competitive contexts, which includes not sharing /withholding 
information, bribing, putting pressure etc. Stakeholders are listed in the next 
section.   
3  Stakeholders in suburban land dynamics 
The World Bank/Malcrow (2006), provide a useful overview of some winners 
and losers in the processes of land change in the suburban areas.  
Amongst the winners are middle/ upper income groups who have access 
to high quality housing and to new lifestyle opportunities. Winners are also the 
construction industry, which develop and build housing, and winners are the 
labourers who find work here- and this could possibly mean jobs to displaced 
farmers. Finally, stakeholders who also stand to gain are the (people who 
develop as) land brokers and who gain new opportunities and capital, and 
become important local players. Positive in suburban development is that it is 
here that there is potential space for national, but especially foreign 
investment- FDI – which is often (too much?) encouraged through access to 
planned industrial estates (compare data on idle industrial parks etc in de Wit, 
2011). Generally, cities benefit from an increased tax base. The urban fringe 
supports industrialisation by providing access to one critical means of 
production, which is relatively cheap and accessible.  
On the negative side are the losers, including the Farmers losing land and 
receiving inadequate compensation leading to impoverishment, and they suffer 
losses of livelihood if they cannot enter the urban labour market (see also de 
Wit, 2011). Possible losers may be city dwellers without Land Use Rights LUR 
(ibid.). The table below indicates that it is especially (urban) residents who may 
not always have the LUR (No Author, 2006). However, it must be noted that 
some citizens themselves are not interested to obtain such LUR certificates as 
they have to pay when issued and they will have to pay tax subsequently 
(Sharpe and Quang 2004:3-5, see also WB-Denmark, 2011).  
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FIGURE 1 
 Percentages of land with LURC for three kinds of land use from 1998-2006  
(for all kinds of land users)  
 
 
Special attention is required for the role and position of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs):  
To some extent, limited access to industrial land simply reflects the 
overwhelming population density and the ensuing shortage of idle space within 
urban boundaries. Most of the existing industrial land is already occupied by 
SOEs, whereas the conversion of agricultural land into industrial land at the 
fringes of the cities is a slow and often controversial process. Thus, the supply of 
available land coming on to the market is too small to meet the demand. But in 
addition, SOEs often get priority in the allocation of whichever land is available. 
The case of Hanoi illustrates the point. In the period from 1994 to 2002, only 
428 new rental contracts covering about 3 million square meters were issued. 
More than half of these contracts were to SOEs. By now, an overwhelming 95% 
of land under lease to organizations in Hanoi is in the hands of SOEs, leaving 
less than 5% to private firms, cooperatives and other production groups. (World 
Bank, 2006: Vietnam Development report, p. 81) 
The importance of SOEs is confirmed by WB/Halcrow (2006: 4-7): 
‘According to the Dept of Construction in Danang, at the end of 2005, there 
were 380 housing projects in Danang City of which 374 belonged to 
Government and SOEs’ (Sharpe & Quang, 2004:1-1): ‘Informal development 
is augmented by large scale construction projects by SOEs for housing and 
industrial zones (see also Han et al, 2008: 1102).  
Perhaps the role of SOEs cannot be separated easily from those of the 
People’s Committees at various levels of administration (province/city; district 
and commune).  
According to AusAid (2000:12) ‘more than any other state organ, People’s 
Committees are the major players in the land management system, with the 
most to lose from a shift from the present situation where officials work in a 
context of discretionary (self-regulated and corruption prone) regulation 
towards universal land tenure rights’. Indeed, Han et al (2008: 1103) indicates 
that ‘Local Governments, in the form of People’s Committees, often act as 
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developers with their own budget and administrative resources (for example, 
issuing building permits). In a later section we will look more closely at 
relations between these groups and organisations. 
4   Land use planning and zoning 
Many reports and articles indicate severe problems with land (use) planning, 
which was confirmed during our field work. Officials, both at DONRE, but 
also at the Provincial, District and Commune level admitted that the planning 
process suffered from too many rules/decrees, and that it was complicated. 
Other sources confirm this, some going so far as to say that there is not 
actually any urban land use planning. One source said ‘it is too late to make 
plans for the urban fringe as the key stakeholders have already put a large mark 
on the land and it will be hard to change things  now… urban planning does 
not work at all9’. A study by DiGregorio and Vogler (2003) concludes that the 
Government of Vietnam strategy of diverting urban growth through a spatially 
balanced urban system that reflects the traditional typology of urban centres as 
nodes on (principally radial) transportation links may be ineffective or 
incomplete in the face of the dynamic urbanization generated within the 
villages in countryside. After discussing the matter with experts and laymen 
and reading the literature, (sub)urban planning in terms using the available land 
seems to be ineffective and inefficient (hence belying the title of the 
assignment). The main problems are listed here: 
Planning systems are too rig id and coordination is weak 
Gillespie captures the problems of planning and development control well in 
this statement (2004: 11-12): 
By controlling the supply and use of land, planning profoundly affects private 
sector development. Soviet-inspired hierarchical, territorial planning requires 
local authorities to base detailed plans on policy solutions pre-determined by 
higher level authorities. Attempts to rigidly apply unrealistic socioeconomic plans 
to a ‘third-world’ built environment, raises land and housing prices beyond the 
means of most private sector players and the cost of peri-urban land clearance 
and development schemes beyond the resources of local authorities. 
Compounding these problems, detailed plans are only prepared for specific new 
developments. As a consequence, there are no mechanisms to allow the State to 
slowly convert non-conforming land use to comply with detailed plans. This all-
or-nothing approach to planning inhibits market forces from determining land 
use. 
There are vast coordination problems. On the one hand planning is taken 
very seriously, and lots of energy may be invested by separate agencies to 
develop plans. On the other hand this leads to many plans (including regular 
Master plans) which can hardly be implemented. One informant said that there 
was quite an interest and dedication to make plans and to develop visions for 
urban development – but that implementation often was non-existent, which is 
                                                 
9 Personal communication during ALMEC interview. 
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partly a coordination matter. Most organisations involved in urban governance 
have a dual reporting responsibility and a dual upward accountability (if the 
downward accountability to the public is not counted for now). One the one 
hand they report to the central line ministry (e.g. DOC to MOC), on the other 
there is a horizontal relation to the appropriate People Committee at the 
various levels and in the various local areas (and policy arenas). Finally, 
organisations, departments and ministries have to comply to the overall 
guidance provided (and expected by) the Party. 
However, this is again not the full story as there may be formal lines of 
authority and accountability, there are plenty cases where, for example, local 
government are going ahead with actions and decisions, without (waiting for) 
higher level approval. In a survey by Malesky (2004), 50% of Local 
Governments were experimenting in the policy field without permission, 
showing two sets of intergovernmental relations: formal and informal ones (in 
Han & Kim, 2010:504).  Gillespie (2004: 12) provides the following useful 
table of agencies involved in land management—but only at the national level 
of Hanoi in the below Table 3: 
Institution Function 
MONRE (Ministry of Natural Resources and the 
Environment 
DONRE (Department of Natural Resources and 
the Environment at the level of the Province) 
• Nation-wide land use planning 
• Land legislation 
• Land disputes 
• Environmental protection  
MoC (Ministry of Construction) • Nation-wide urban planning 
• Urban land use planning 
• Housing construction 
• Housing disputes 
State Bank • Regulates bank interest rates 
• Determines lending and debt security policies 
for banks. 
MPI (Ministry of Planning and Investment) • Approval of plans for capital investment 
• Preparation of industrial parks 
• Economic planning 
MARD (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development) 
• Management of Agricultural land and unused 
land  
MoF ( Ministry of Finance) • Land taxation and fee collection 
• Land valuation 
• Managing State land 
• Financing State land management 
MoJ (Ministry of Justice) • Land legislation 
• Drafting real estate industry decree 
 
Many more agencies are involved at Province, District and even Ward 
levels. These agencies include the City/provincial agencies of Department of 
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Natural Resources and Environment DONRE (for land use), Department of 
Construction DOC (urban development) Department of Transport 
(transportation) whereas the Department of Planning and Investment DPI 
makes am umbrella Social Development Plan. However all these plans are by 
and large unrelated, resulting in severe implementation problems, as at the 
ground level things are obviously related – the environment to transport, social 
development to planning parks and playgrounds. So generally, the problems 
are not with planning as such, but with plan implementation. Observers say 
that the recent 2010 Urban Planning Law does not entirely deal with these 
issues and that it still has the ideology of the past. 
 Several studies indicate land planning problems (Gillespie, 2004, World 
Bank, 2006, No Author, 2006). Local agencies, including large cities, are seen 
to be in confusion about the linkages between Land Use Plans, construction 
plan, and rural residential areas plan. Land Use Plans, especially at the 
provincial and district level, do not meet social-economic development 
demands and the feasibility of implementation of Land Use Plans is limited, as 
there may be a lack of inputs from other sectors. These observations are 
confirmed in our interviews e.g. with DONRE in HCMC. Sharpe and Quang, 
2004: 1-1) confirm this: ‘planning of all types tends to be centrally driven and 
top down but remains uncoordinated with each entity pursuing its own 
mission’ and ‘Urban planning is unprepared for the emerging market oriented 
economy’. One issue is of course that planning is a state task, and that 
implementation is almost always in private sector hands—and there are 
normally (considerable) differences between what is planned and agreed upon 
by the State and what the developer/contractor does (quote VN news). 
Plans and policies are not implemented or enforced 
There is a marked contract between all the activity that is being undertaken to 
make plans from higher to lower levels of administration, and to collect data 
and report these diligently to higher levels of government – and the lack of 
actually enforcing the rules and regulations and legal provisions. It appears that 
there is some kind of collective unwillingness by most stakeholders – both 
state, not state, private parties and households- o abide by the rules or to 
enforce them. Sharpe and Quang (2004: 3-16) have put the problems well10: 
There have been many violations of land use regulations by both 
household construction and state projects in the city, particularly in peripheral 
areas. Very limited sanctions have been imposed against such violations.  
Enforcement has been weak while the pressure of development is immense.  
In addition, many local authorities lack the human resources and a sufficient 
development control framework to implement the construction regulations.  
The absence of planned affordable new housing is leading to further growth of 
illegal settlements. 
                                                 
10 Vietnam News reports 7-7-2011 ‘Can Tho admits land use ‘errors’. The Can Tho 
PC earmarked places and approved investments without adhering to the land use plan 
approved by the Prime Minster. Inspectors also found irregularities with the DONRE 
like not carefully assessing investor plans.  
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Encroachment occurs on all types of public and private lands with the use of 
road and footpath space by vendors and the filling of drainage ditches and lakes 
as the most conspicuous.  Clearly the local official’s willingness to enforce 
setbacks for rights-of-way is virtually non-existent.  One explanation is that 
“rent-seeking” behaviour trumps exercise of responsibility and management.  
Another is that short-term benefit to the population for use of the land area is 
considered more important by local officials than and long-term cost savings if 
and when the infrastructure is actually provided (ibid: 3-31).   
Planning follows actual developments  
There has been a very fast change in Vietnam where everything was planned, 
controlled and provided by the state, to a situation (following Doi Moi, and 
changing ever more quickly) where developments driven by the market and the 
collective actions of citizens – as well as the informal/illegal actions of officials 
– have created dynamics that are out of control of the government. While the 
state is still trying to plan and control (sub) urban land use, it is too slow to do 
that properly. Citizens who require permits and building licenses have to wait 
too long if they follow normal legal channels, so they take a shortcut and pay 
some bribes. Also, by the time a Master or General Socio-development plan is 
completed and ready for being translated into detailed planning at lower levels 
of administration, things have already changed so much that such planning is 
often rather meaningless.  
It is important to establish that more than 75-85% of the housing is 
constructed in the informal sector; which already goes to show that the formal 
(state) sector fails to meet housing needs (Sharpe Quang, 2004: 3-33). 
MONRE estimated that 40% of houses in Hanoi lack registered land titles, and 
that even houses with titles are routinely traded outside the state system (in 
Gillespie, 2011: 254). He quotes an IFC survey indicating that the level of land 
transactions taking place outside the state land tenure system at 75%. In such 
circumstances where housing and land affairs are largely beyond the control 
and probably (?) knowledge of the state, planning becomes ever so more 
difficult or should one say irrelevant. Communes develop into small towns and 
people themselves slowly delineate and improve roads, was shown for the Ha 
Dinh commune by Sharpe & Quang. More generally, housing complexes, 
residential housing expansions evolve without state approval and outside the 
plans.  
There are three major problems here: The state so firstly loses out on 
selling land itself at proper rates to people who want to buy or develop housing 
or to start industries in suburban land; the state is confronted with 
spontaneous realities of planning and layouts which may not at all be as per 
plans, and may even be contrary to accepted norms of human habitation, 
environmental concerns, regular plot size or floor-space-index etc. And finally, 
the state will some time have to provide infrastructure and facilities but now at 
a much higher cost in much more complex conditions as people are living 
there already and which also means higher prices to compensate those who are 
to lose land, houses or farms. The State foregoes massive amounts of receipts, 
it loses all the way in such urban fringe dynamics, whereas all other parties gain 
—but they may have to wait long for acceptable living conditions. To the 
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extent that the state has provided infrastructure before construction or 
occupancy, it generally lacks a mechanism to recoup those costs (Sharpe and 
Quang, 2004).  
Capacity in terms of human resources is lacking 
One element of urban planning problems is a capacity problem, where officials 
in the various national and lower level planning agencies are quite good at the 
technical work of making concrete maps, but there appears to be a lack of 
skills of creatively coming up with novel ideas or innovative designs, or to 
develop a new vision or new ideas. This is no doubt related to the Vietnamese 
education system where there is perhaps less attention for promoting creative, 
individual, critical thinking, as well as to existing intra-organisational realities 
which are relatively hierarchical (in terms of organisational theorist G. Morgan 
organisations more as bureaucracies and ‘machines’, rather than as ‘brains’, 
which are organisations geared to organisational learning, learning from past 
mistakes, and adapting to changing environments). This links to remarks made 
by Gillipsy, 2004:11-12, who correctly argues that the lack of evidence-based 
policy analysis leads to a general unawareness of the economic, social and 
environmental costs associated with overlapping, contradictory and overly 
managerial land management practices.  
Capacity is also needed in urban management skills: urban management 
must be strengthened before planning can be effective: skills in planning, 
architecture, cost benefit analysis, GIS techniques etc. Besides, there is a lack 
of data and transparency vis-à-vis citizens. The World Bank et al. (2010: 10) 
has published a report on the availability of data on land management, and 
there are generally severe problems in data available to the Vietnamese citizens. 
However, the larger cities perform better than some provinces, but it is often 
the most sensitive and important information that is lacking also there. All this 
leads to a high degree of ‘administrative mist’; and insufficient transparency (cf. 
de Wit, 2007). 
No zone planning 
Vietnam has not really adopted urban planning methods which are common in 
many developed countries where there is less emphasis on detailed overall 
master plans but where urban development often on a case by case basis is 
guided by general guidelines of urban development zones11. This means rough 
rules for areas, but a detailed framework of indicators for houses, height, Floor 
Space Indexes FSI etc. In fact the Land Law of 2003 has an article 23 relating 
to ‘Principles for Making of Land Use Zoning and Land Use Plans’, but all 
                                                 
11 Land-use Zoning: ‘The introduction of a land-use zoning system and the application 
of use class tables to guide future land-use development are proposed. The types of 
building activities that are permitted in each of the land-use zones are usually guided 
by the use class tables. There are various formats of use class tables. Principally, 
however, they contain a demarcation of the land-use zone on the map, the main 
development objectives of the zones, permitted building uses, conditional building 
uses, and building uses not permitted in the zones’, (HAIDEP, 2007:159) 
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evidence indicates that this clause is not (yet) being implemented in the spirit 
of the law. And is zoning has been marked in the plans, zoning changes are 
frequent and unpredictable, possibly the result of local discretion, or different 
ground realities as compared to the land data/cadastre.  
Planning as clearance—leap frog urbanisation and urban sprawl 
There appears to be a preference for high rise urban development in the fringe 
of Vietnamese cities, which is presently perhaps most visible in Hanoi where 
one finds a scattering of high rise apartment blocks all over the urban fringe. 
These may have been constructed in land where there were settlements before 
but which were cleared. This leads to a specific type of city, one characteristic 
of which is that it is normally has to rely on individual transport; it leads to a 
‘high rise’ city, with ‘urban sprawl’ and not to a compact city. A model would 
be possible of starting from the existing urban village and start planning city 
expansion around that village, taking over elements of style and architecture, 
preserving unique buildings and urban heritage12.  
Environmental issues 
One severe and apparently increasing problem is pollution, which has several 
reasons including the rapid expansion of personal and public transport, which 
has raised levels of urban smog and ‘fine dust’. The World Bank/ Malcrow 
2006 argue that ‘Inadequate enforcement of environmental regulations can lead 
to pollution while poor planning can result in the proximate development of 
residential and industrial areas’. This is then again related to the fact that there 
are often delays in the installation of waste treatment plants in industrial parks, 
so that untreated solid waste and effluents are dumped into local waterways 
and landfills13.  McPhearson et all (2010) indicate a serious issue of the wrong 
incentives here: ‘Our discussions with provincial authorities in Vinh Phuc and 
Binh Dinh indicate that some of these delays are strategic. The fines for 
improperly treated discharges and waste are significantly less than the costs of 
installing and operating waste treatment plants’. 
5  Informality and corruption 
It was already mentioned that much of land and housing in Vietnamese cities 
and their suburbs is informal: 75-85% of the housing is constructed in the 
informal sector; 40% of houses in Hanoi lack registered land titles, the level of 
land transactions taking place outside the state land tenure system at 75%. This 
is no doubt the major issue as regards the scope for an efficient use of and for 
planning for suburban land. Partly this relates to a certain slackness of officials 
at various levels to enforce existing rules and regulations- perhaps, as one 
                                                 
12 Personal communication ALMEC representative. 
13 Vietnam News 9-7-2011 ‘Pollution threatens city water supply’- reporting that the 
pollution in the Saigon river has become worse over the years as increasing 
industrialisation along the river bank threatens the main source of HCMC’.  
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source states (…. ) they simply cannot cope with all the action taking place at 
once. Partly it is the result of rent seeking of these officials who rather take 
some money than to serve state/the common interest. Finally it may be partly 
related to traditions and cultural norms where views on land and how to use it 
may not always be consistent with the de facto private property regime of the 
land laws. Sharpe and Quang (2004: 3-12) argue that, besides the government, 
nobody wants regulation and formality which would mean control and taxes. 
In their case study of a Hanoi suburban commune make the following 
observation which helps explain the reasons for large scale informality (3-28): 
State control over the use, transfer, pricing and tariffs, and the land titling and 
registration system has limited official land development because the system is 
too cumbersome. The delays and subterfuge reported by developers and (FDI) 
investors for large scale projects is indicative of the vagaries of state 
management.  Delay and inadequacy of state projects have promoted informal 
land development and transfer on household basis.  Constraints on land 
availability through formal channels probably serves to inflate housing prices to 
the ultimate consumer.  Current prices of formal dwellings (built with official 
permit) are very high and inaccessible for most low and middle-income 
households.  Pricing and shear availability differentials between state allocation 
and market value are an encouragement to individuals to operate in the 
functional system outside the formal system.   
Corruption is pervasive  
There is corruption in all land transactions in Vietnam, including land use 
planning, land conversion and land allocation to investors after land recovery- 
with serious risks in land price determination (World Bank, Denmark Embassy 
et al 2011; IPSARD, 2010). Perhaps surprisingly, during our fieldwork we 
could not establish evidence as to the incidence of corruption or land 
speculation14. Respondents in our interviews, focus group discussions and 
surveys do not often openly refer to corruption – which could indicate that it is 
less omnipresent as is indicated in many reports, or – what is more likely - that 
there is a feeling that it may be risky to openly discuss this. This may even 
apply to interviewers (or my translators) being reluctant to ask, or ‘you can ask 
it but you will get no answer’.  
Some sources state that the main determinant of urban land use planning 
is the tendency of people in positions of decision making and power to make 
money for themselves. Sharpe and Quang (2004:3-10) argue that ‘Planning 
done by officials may be designed to obtain private profits and rent seeking 
behaviour, which undermines planning for the public good and to externalise 
costs’. The example they provide is of a allowing a developer client to build a 
housing block at some distance and then the area in between becomes ripe for 
de facto less intense but more informal development based on the ‘precedent’ 
of existing development and the wishes for benefits of local officials. Another 
                                                 
14 In contrast, various sources agree there is plenty speculation, e.g. that speculators 
from Hanoi amd HCMA buy plots in resettlement areas in the urba fringe of Danang.  
Land prices in the former cities are high; speculation is driven by the lack of asset 
substitutes to land (World Bank/ALMEC, 2007a: 30).  
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example that was mentioned during our fieldwork was the very real problems 
in Vietnamese cities to relocate people for roads and, bridges and the like. The 
costs of compensation nowadays often exceed the actual construction costs - 
but then part (some say half) of the latter funds may again be lost due to 
corruption. Corruption is related to ineffective planning systems operating at 
different levels, which are confusing and opaque, so that the public is unaware 
of actual plans and implementation implications (World Bank & UN Aid 
2010). This lopsided access to critical information offers discretion to officials 
to anticipate on changes in land use and planned conversion. Corruption is also 
made easier through a lack of solid land data as in a comprehensive, constantly 
updated cadastre and in making public all plans and licenses.  
Han and Kim (2008: 502) have carried out a content analysis of a 
Vietnamese newspaper from 1999-2006 and show that a majority of articles 
about land issues and controversies were editorials critical of the government, 
portraying government officials as ‘greedy and corrupt individuals who took 
advantage of their position and did not follow the official regulations’. For all 
the mostly negative reports and pessimism, one source (The World 
Bank/Halcrow 2006:78) indicates that ‘in Hanoi the State has tried to address 
the problem of speculation, by increasing taxation charged on land transfers, 
making buying and selling over a short period of time more expensive. 
Secondly, developers who are allocated land for residential development 
purposes are no longer allowed to divide the land into plots and sell it on 
without developing the site. These measures curbing land speculation seem to 
have been effective in that land prices have fallen’. However, these findings 
need to be further checked.  
Legal pluralism and ‘hanging plans’  
The fact that corruption is generally perceived as a key problem in land 
management, and that much activity in land management occurs outside state 
contexts raises the question how relevant the formal planning rules and norms 
are to regulate all this informal activity (Sharpe et all 2004: 3-31): 
There is considerable scepticism that planned improvements will actually occur 
and reasonable expectation that if they do, they will beyond the term of office or 
tenure of the officials.  In fact, the term quy hoach for land use plans and also 
applied to utility plans implies scepticism about when and whether they will be 
implemented (in comparison to socio-economic plans that are ke hoach and 
considered “real” plans.  Land use plans are also referred to as “hanging plans,” -
- quy hoach treo -- good only for hanging on walls.  In that environment, it is no 
wonder that officials do not place a high priority on the preservation of utility 
corridors. 
The same question has been asked about the law, in interesting 
perspectives which argue that laws such as the land laws may not be the best or 
only way to deal with land ownership and access to land. It can be argued that 
land laws based on Western notions of exclusive property rights and which 
regulate and enforce a rigid private property ownership of the land may miss 
out on key traditions and community cultural norms and practices relating to 
land (Gillespie, 2011; Sikor, 2004). There has been a global trend to 
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increasingly establish the legal formalisation and clarification of property rights, 
which may be at the detriment of those not formally owning or having claims 
to property. This same trend also underlies the land legislation which has been 
introduced in Vietnam since 1993 and which is evolving rapidly in the context 
of fast transformation, as well as the demands of local and global capital and 
investors.  
However, in the past people may have had property rights or claims 
traditionally as per community, clan or tribal custom, based on other values of 
land – not only as a commodity, but perhaps forming a mythical and 
legitimizing basis for family or community ties (ibid: 254). Gillespie shows that 
courts do take notions of what he calls ‘self-regulatory communities’ into 
account. Such communities are constituted by people who interact much, 
being from the same local area, and include land brokers, ward (Phuong) level 
officials and urban residents (ibid: 257). He shows that judges may take 
(informal, traditional) notions that are held by the communities into account, 
and that they play a large role on the Local Government Conciliation Councils. 
These are for a where urban land conflicts are discussed between the two 
contestants, the Phuong head, officials from construction departments and 
representatives of the Mass Organisations. The question arises as to whether 
and how this discourse is relevant to the development of new land legislation. 
Should there be more attention for the difference between ‘theoretical land use 
planning’ and the actual, practical, real, and ‘likely to be implemented’ land use 
planning? Sharpe and Quang ( 2004:3-9; also 2-12) note: ‘with a lack of 
jurisprudence, each case is resolved on its own merits. The “rights model” that 
governs land use and ownership under Western Law is not readily transferable 
and would create chaos in Vietnam”.  
5   Benefits and impacts of  alternative uses of  suburban 
land for local communities 
Some evidence is presented here on the impacts of fast suburban change on 
the residents in these suburbs and urban fringe areas. Two case studies are 
quoted to throw light on the matter: the Study of Ha Dinh (Sharpe & Quang: 
2004: 3-25), a village 6 km south of Hanoi, where developments were traced 
following Doi Moi, and where residents by and large benefited much from 
changes. ‘Small manufacturing enterprises were attracted by the original nature 
of Thuong Dinh industrial zone. Small residential development accompanied 
the relaxation of restrictions and economic growth. Private self-built housing 
and manufacturing operations filled the vacant cultivated land and water 
bodies”. Infill and expansion preceded any planning or construction of the 
necessary infrastructure (water supply, sanitation, roads, drainage and 
electricity).  It appears then as if the villagers seized and benefited from the 
new opportunities, both in terms of land (subdivision and selling  of land and 
gardens), in terms of housing (reconstruct and enlarge existing housing and 
give out for renting) and employment (starting small family based enterprises, 
not state trading and manufacturing). However, adverse consequences are 
reported in terms of the environment and infrastructure.  
26 
 
In another case study, Phuc (2009) notes an increased social 
differentiation in the suburban Hue commune that he studied. He finds that a 
majority of people have managed to find new work in Hue or surrounding 
areas and in industrial zones. He makes the important point that in the past, 
village wealth could be best measured by the amount of land a household 
possessed; this is no longer the case. Indeed, it is often middle and rich 
household who converted all their land and are doing very well. It is rather the 
small farmers (2-3 sao) who have kept the land and practise agriculture. While 
before the period of large scale agricultural land conversion 60% of the 
Household heads were farmers, by 2007 the average of non-farm income is 
very high at 91,3% , while the ratio of farming to household income declined 
from 22 to 9%. The biggest change was for the poor households, where the 
non-farm income is 89% compared to 69% before land conversion (ibid:10-
12). Phuc (2009:15) indicates that ‘It is mostly the poor farmers and the people 
of above age 50  and who do not meet the requirements to work in factories, 
industrial zones and other non-farm occupations because of a lack of skills, 
education, health, and discipline that cause them to face many difficulties in 
their lives’. There are many industrial zones as well as factories in the suburban 
areas, some of which provide employee housing, either temporary or even 
quite durable, often for unmarried occupants.  
6   Urban agriculture 
Urban agriculture can be defined as “the growing of plants and the raising of 
animals within and around cities” (RUAF, 2011). It is different from rural 
agriculture in that it is integrated into the urban economic and ecological 
system, for example the use of urban residents as labourers, use of typical 
urban resources (like organic waste as compost and urban wastewater for 
irrigation), direct links with urban consumers, direct impacts on urban ecology 
(positive and negative), being part of the urban food system. Besides, urban 
agriculture is marked by the fact that land use faces competition with other 
urban functions, and that it is influenced by urban policies and plans- especially 
of course land in the peri-urban fringe areas. This is why the study of urban 
agriculture can be part if a study of suburban land use.  
A few characteristics of urban agriculture are listed here (taken from 
RUAF, 2011; and Moustier, et al. 2010). These include that women constitute 
an important part of urban farmers, since agriculture and related processing 
and selling activities, among others, can often be more easily combined with 
their other tasks in the household; that it may take place in locations inside the 
cities (intra-urban) or in the peri-urban areas. Urban agriculture includes food 
products, (grains, root crops, vegetables, mushrooms, fruits) and animals as 
well as non-food products (like aromatic and medicinal herbs, ornamental 
plants, tree products, etc.) or combinations of these. It includes agricultural 
production activities as well as related processing and marketing activities, even 
while the produce may be for self-consumption, with surpluses being trade.  
Relevant issues around urban agriculture that need to be studied include 
food security, its economic and income impacts, the social impacts and impacts 
on urban ecology. Where Vietnam is concerned, there is evidence that in 
27 
 
Hanoi, 80% of fresh vegetables, 50% of pork, poultry and fresh water fish, as 
well as 40% of eggs, originate from urban and peri-urban areas (Nguyen Tien 
Dinh, 2000, in RUAF, 2011). This is confirmed by Moustier and Loc (2010), 
who indicate that about 30% of the population around Hanoi and HCMC is 
engaged in agriculture. 
Various issues to be noted as a result of our investigation into Urban 
Agriculture are now listed here. A key one is the need to further define what is 
precisely urban agriculture in a context which is often changing very fast. For 
example, the city of Hanoi has just been expanded to now include a vast rural 
hinterland, all of which is now suddenly categorized as nominally urban. At the 
same time there are still many smaller scale ‘traditional’ farms here (see 
Moustier, 2010), which keep on farming pretty much as they always have done. 
Seen this way, there is plenty urban agriculture – including the Cu Chi area 
north of HCMC. However, it needs emphasizing that the city is always near, 
and that our fieldwork data indicate that many farmers are only part time 
farmers now, and that many household members now work in or near the city, 
for example in industries or trade (cf. de Wit, 2011).  
But most people agree that the small scale farmer is losing ground (and 
land) steadily as has been amply documented in the above. Indeed, some 
sources say that there is actually an overall vision that Vietnam needs to 
urbanise and modernize. Farmers face very strong competition for their land 
from industry, and developers and private residents seeking more or better 
housing (‘urban villas with a garden’). One obvious key reason is the price of 
the key production factor land: as soon as demand for land increases in the 
urban fringe, the relative land/income ratio changes and the farmer may be 
inclined to sell or seek employment alternatives.  
Most officials and other well informed persons did not see much scope 
for urban agriculture, or to promote that deliberately. This especially seems to 
apply to the idea to create large intensive agricultural parks near cities. One 
argument for this might be lower transaction costs. In discussions with an 
Agro-Park entrepreneur near HCMC, he rather felt that it made more sense to 
move agriculture away from the cities – and to create large(r) and intensive 
agri-businesses at suitable locations in the provinces – given of course that 
these are connected through proper roads or railways. Indeed, there is a 
Decree which aims at promoting industrialisation of rural areas (so why ruralise 
the city? he asked).   
At the same time, there are initiatives around the cities (both near HCMC 
as well as Hanoi) where farmers join forces in (loose) collectives; so that they 
for example can agree with a supermarket to reliably provide fresh and clean 
vegetables. There may be scope here for farmers to maintain or even increase 
incomes this way, and such voluntary forms of collective farming/marketing 
may offer a useful model to emulate.  
One might conclude that forms of urban agriculture will always exist and 
remain – but rather more like a niche market - where a number of factors 
coincide to make it viable, if only temporarily: the availability of cultivable land 
in or near a city (including roof tops, vacant land waiting for construction or 
legally contested), labour to work the land (often women), and a market for the 
agricultural produce – the more near, the lower the transaction costs.  
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7   Conclusions 
This final section contains some recommendations, where three remarks are in 
order. First, this is not the first text about land use planning and zoning and 
(sub) urban management (even while it proved hard to find much (recent) 
evidence at all as regards urban agriculture. Indeed there is a whole range of 
(donor agency) papers which have thoughtful and appropriate 
recommendations, and they have informed the suggestions mentioned here, 
sometimes added if seen as important (e.g. Sharpe and Quang, 2004).  
Secondly, recommendations need to be feasible within a specific context, a 
specific political economy. This text has indicated lots of informal if not illegal 
and corrupt action surrounding land planning and urban management 
generally- and this occurs in informal arenas where information and money are 
shared amongst the powerful for private purposes. The main recommendation 
must then be that this larger and more structural matter needs addressing first, 
and this is something the Government of Vietnam, its numerous powerful 
public sector and party officials need to do - in a way that fits national and 
local institutional realities- and with an eye to equity, general people’s welfare 
and sustainability. 
Vietnam itself has to make a choice as to what type of cities it wants, 
whether it wants to stop the long term adverse consequences of lopsided 
planning which fosters inequality, and whether it can afford to lose so much 
capital in terms of informal and/or illegal land transactions in what in fact is 
state land. Presently, the private sector and (richer, educated) citizens benefit 
unduly in an uncontrolled urbanisation process, while state later has to pay the 
bill to add infrastructure at higher cost. This refers to the need to agree on a 
clear urban development strategy, based on an evidence based analysis of 
present realities and forces operating on cities and a frank and honest 
assessment of what goes wrong.  
It would basically mean that existing laws are enforced (forcefully, if only 
to set examples), to enhance accountability, to refrain from illegal action. The 
laws as they are do not form the main problem: they are relatively good, give or 
take an amendment or clause, and they can be implemented in the right spirit. 
There is however a clear need for better rules and tools for urban 
management15. This confirms with the main recommendation of the World 
Bank/Denmark land corruption reference book (2011:xiii): all that is needed is 
to actually implement the existing laws ‘the most obvious step is to thoroughly 
enforce the transparency provisions already in VN law’. It is of course only 
when Vietnam itself moves – as it has done admirably and remarkably already 
so far, that well-meaning recommendations from consultants or donor 
agencies have a chance to catch on. There are many very thoughtful people, 
                                                 
15 Do Tu Lan, deputy head of the Urban Development Department (Ministry of 
Construction) said many cities lacked control over investment. "The management 
capacity in cities for urban development is still poor," she said. Most cities and urban 
areas now have common planning for infrastructure development. Local authorities 
have the right to approve planning projects but it is hard to identify where investment 
sources should come from. This is a big problem in urban development. (Vietnam 
News, (02-12-2008) 
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including officials and politicians who know which way to proceed. And many 
of such recommendations will then be in the field of institutional strengthening 
and of building capacities at all levels16. 
Thirdly, this text does not include assessing or advising on legal matters, 
which is therefore left to others. However, some critical matters are listed, 
mostly needing more research or further work.  
The key recommendations relate then to suggestions in the field of 
governance (transparency, accountability, fighting corruption) and institutions 
(as in the rules of the game, norms and values, but especially addressing 
lopsided or perverse incentives which fundamentally determine urban 
governance and (suburban) land management). As indicated by some people 
interviewed, problems of suburban land use and management are not technical, 
but institutional. However, as indicated, the leadership of Vietnam have to take 
the lead, and subsequently such recommendations only become potentially 
successful, and the same applies to the remaining suggestions.  
In agreement with a recommendation of AusAid (2000:7), there is a clear 
need for further clarification of the powers and responsibilities of land 
management agencies. Land management is complicated by unclear divisions 
of responsibility at the central level between the Ministry of Construction, 
MONRE, MPI, the General Department of Land Administration. There is 
poor communication (and mostly top-down) between the central agencies and 
local governments. There appear to be many land management conflicts, and 
there is evidence of ‘unlawful’ land allocation by People’s Committees.  
One key issue includes assessing and adjusting incentives, and any change 
needs to consider this (e.g. government salaries). For example, expanding 
urban boundaries appears to be in the personal interest of urban officials as 
this may add to their performance status, as the data on production increase, 
and whereas larger areas receive more central government support. Local 
Government has an incentive to recover land to comply with the Central 
Government and other directives relating to industrialisation, commercial or 
other development and to support the expansion of non-agricultural activity. 
As local government tax revenue is very low, provinces and districts have an 
incentive to gain funds for infrastructure and other expenses (even apart from 
rent seeking monies). Provinces have an incentive to promote urbanisation and 
industrialisation so that they can claim to be part of the national efforts to 
modernize and grow economically (IPSARD, 2010).  
Suggestions as regards land use  
Even while this cannot always be avoided, it needs to be explored to see 
whether it is viable not to build high rise housing blocks after clearing of peri-
urban land – which leads to private transport based enclaves and urban sprawl. 
Better to promote the ‘compact city’ and start from existing (sub)urban villages 
and towns and create in circles high density urban areas or clusters, reachable 
                                                 
16  ALMEC is supporting the Capacity Development of the Vietnamese Institute for 
Architecture and Planning VIAP, as part of its urban development program for 
Hanoi. 
30 
 
by public transport and where people walk and use cycles and motorbikes as in 
present inner cities. This of course requires the state to take a much more pro-
active planning role: first provide infrastructure, then subdivide plots and 
parcels, ideally mixing housing, shops and entertainment, green spaces and 
employment. Then closely monitor developments. Planning (as in industrial 
zones) must take into account employment much more. Planning must be for 
the long term: invest for the future: tax rather than short term gains through 
the creating Industrial Zones where (local) government incomes are large but 
one time.  
This study did not find much evidence of viable and expandable urban 
agriculture, and there is little (recent) information available. Active promotion 
does not seem viable; it will occur when possible and economically viable- 
which is the situation today. As is already happening in the suburbs of Hanoi 
and HCMC there may be scope for farmers to work more together in 
collectives to jointly work towards reliable production for nearby urban 
markets. One interesting combination may be for farmers to target city tourists 
to help/visit/collect products. Problems that may be experienced by suburban 
farmers are listed by Mai Thi Phuong Anh et al. (2004) and may be addressed: 
farmers indicate that they face a lack of market information; they lack contacts 
with new partners for the marketing of products; there may be a lack of 
customers’ trust in the products’ quality; and there is the factor of the 
seasonality of production.  
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